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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
SHIRMAN MILLINER and GEORGE
A. BURCH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

ELMER FOX & COMPANY, DON A.
STRINGHAM, L A R R Y M. FOLL E T T , and STRINGHAM AND
FOLLETT, a professional corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

13520

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ELMER FOX & COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs allege that they purchased stock in Commercial liquidators, Inc., a Utah corporation, in part in
reliance upon financial statements prepared by Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, that as a result of negligence on the part of Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company,
the financial statements were totally inaccurate, false and
misleading and that Plaintiffs have suffered damage as a
result of their purchase of said stock.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company made a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,
Judge, granted said motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, seeks affirmance
of the lower Court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, generally agrees
with the facts as set forth in Appellants' brief, but desires
to bring additional facts to the attention of the Court as
well as clarify some of the facts set forth by Appellants.
It should be pointed out that a separate motion to
dismiss was made by Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company,
and Defendants, Don A. Stringham, Larry M. Follett and
Stringham and Follett, and both motions were granted
by the lower Court.
The argument of Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company,
at the hearing on the Defendants' motions to dismiss was
that Plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and that Plaintiff had failed
to join indispensable parties. As to the first ground for
dismissal Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company argued that
it could not be liable for negligence to a third party with
whom it was not in privity in the preparation of the finan-
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cial statements in question and that no private cause of
action exists for a violation of Section 61-1-1 of the Utah
Code Annotated.
On the second basis for the motion to dismiss of Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company — failure to join indispensable parties — said Defendant argued that the Plaintiffs had, in violation of Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, intentionally failed to join Commercial Liquidators, Inc. (the corporation from which they
allegedly purchased the securities in question), Boyd
Madsen (the president of Commercial Liquidators, Inc.),
Dennis Madsen (the son of Boyd Madsen who was entrusted with property of Commercial Liquidators, Inc.
and who apparently used said property as his own) and
others.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFFS MUST ALLEGE PRIVITY OF
C O N T R A C T BETWEEN THEMSELVES
AND DEFENDANT, ELMER FOX & COMPANY IN ORDER TO STATE A C L A I M
AGAINST SAID D E F E N D A N T UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
A careful reading of Counts II and III of Plaintiffs'
complaint, the only counts which sound against Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, will clearly show that there
is no allegation of privity between said Defendant and
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Plaintiffs. On the contrary, the allegations in the complaint (see paragraph 16 of Count II), and the facts as
stated in Appellants' brief, (see item 2.a under FACTS)
show that the financial statements were prepared by
Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company at the request of and
for Commercial Liquidators, Inc. No privity between said
Defendant and Plaintiffs is alleged by Plaintiffs and without such an allegation Plaintiffs have failed to state
a claim for professional misrepresentation against Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company upon which relief can be
granted.
The leading case in the area of accountants' responsibility to third parties is the case of Ultramares Corp. v.
Towche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931), cited and
quoted from in Plaintiffs' brief. In Ultramares the Court
of Appeals of New York speaking through Chief Justice
Cardozo reasoned that it would be contrary to public
policy to impose liability upon accountants in an indeterminate amount, to an indeterminate class and for an
indeterminate time. The Court, therefore, limited such
potential liability by ruling that to be liable for negligence
an accountant must be in privity of contract with the
claimant and that an accountant is liable to third parties
only for fraud.
It does no more than say that, if less than this
is proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere profession of an opinion,
but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for
negligence is one that is bounded by the contract,
and is to be enforced between the parties by
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whom the contract has been made. We doubt
whether the average businessman receiving a
certificate without paying for it, and receiving
it merely as one among a multitude of possible
investors, would look for anything more.
Id. at 189, 174 N. E. at 448.
Plaintiffs have not alleged fraud against Defendant,
Elmer Fox & Company, and their complaint cannot be
construed to sound in fraud against said Defendant for
if it were so construed it would run afoul of the requirement of Rule 9 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
that fraud be pled with particularity.
The case of Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.
Supp. 85 (D. R. I. 1968), quoted in part by Plaintiffs on
page 6 of their brief, does not stand for the proposition,
as appears to be Plarintiffs' reading of the case, that an
accountant is liable for negligence in preparation of financial statements to any and all third parties who may at
some time rely upon the financials in some possible way.
On the contrary, all that the court in Rusch Factors held
was that an accountant may be liable in negligence for
careless financial misrepresentations relied upon by actually foreseen and limited classes of persons who are
not in privity with the accountant.
With respect, then to the plaintiffs' negligence theory, this Court holds that an accountant should be liable in negligence for careless
financial misrepresentations relied upon by actually foreseen and limited classes of persons.
According to the plaintiff's complaint in the in-
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stant case, the defendant knew that his certification was to be used for, and had as its very
aim and purpose, the reliance of potential financiers of the Rhode Island corporation.
Id. at 92-93.
Clearly the Plaintiffs in this case are not members of
a class actually foreseen by Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company as going to rely upon the financial statements prepared by it. Moreover, even if said Defendant had actually
foreseen potential stockholders as a class of persons who
might rely upon the financial statements such a class is
not a "limited class" as required by the Court in Rusch
Factors. Indeed to extend the potential liability of accountants for negligence to all persons who in purchasing
stock in a public company at some unknown time might
possibly rely upon financial statements prepared by them
would clearly have the result which Chief Justice Cardozo
foresaw in Ultramares and which the Court in that case,
as well as the Court in Rusch Factors, wisely avoided.
A different question develops when we ask
whether they owed a duty to these to make it
without negligence. If liability for negligence
exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of
deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The
hazards of a business conducted on these terms
are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a
flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty
that exposes to these consequences.
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Uitramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 179-80, 174
N.E. 441,444 (1931).
Section 552 of the proposed draft of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, cited and quoted in part on page 7
of Appellants' brief, goes no further than the Court in
Rusch Factors and limits third party liability of professionals for negligent misrepresentation to those persons
for whose benefit and guidance the representation is supplied or to whom they know the recipient intends to supply it.
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in a transaction in
which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the
liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to
loss suffered
(a) By the person or one of the persons for
whose benefit and guidance he intends to
supply the information, or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) Through reliance upon it in a transaction
which he intends the information to influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The lability of one who is under a public

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
duty to give the information extends to loss
suffered by any of the class of persons for whose
benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (Tent. Draft No.
12, 1966).
The limited scope of proposed section 552 is indicated
by note 2 to the proposed section.
2. Where the defendant merely supplies information for the recipient to use as he sees fit, without any purpose of his own to reach third persons, a narrower rule is required. It is not enough
that it is "foreseeable" that the information will
reach third persons. In one sense it is always
"foreseeable" that any information will be communicated to others. Something more is required. This is made very clear by a long list of
cases holding that one who negligently gives a
certificate, or other information, to A is not liable
when it reaches B and causes pecuniary loss to
him in the absence of some information as to A's
intent to reach B.
Id. Note 2 at 15 (Citing Ultramares and other cases on
the question of accountants' liability to third parties).
The great weight of authority continues to support
the position of the New York Court of Appeals in Ultramares that an accountant is not liable for mere negligence
to parties with whom he is not in privity. See Stephens
Industries, Inc. v. Haskins and Sells, 438 F. 2d 357, 359
(10th Oir. 1971). Also those courts which have expanded
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the scope of Ultramares have done so only to a limited
degree so as to allow members of limited and foreseen
classes of third parties to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation against accountants although not in privity
with them. See 46 A. L. R. 3d 979 (1972) and cases cited
therein. The trend in the law, if it is one, is not, as Plaintiffs would have the Court believe, a wholesale rejection
of the Ultramares case, but is merely a new means of
limiting the scope of accountants' potential liability for
negligence and is not an invitation to the kind of indeterminate liability to and indeterminate class for an indeterminate time that the Ultramares rule was designed
to avoid. Even under the most liberal of the more recent
cases on this issue, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim for relief against Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company
for professional misrepresentation upon which relief can
be granted and their complaint was therefore properly
dismissed by the lower Court.
POINT II.
NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS
FOR A VIOLATION OF SECTION 61-1-1 OF
THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
Section 61-1-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, which
is Section 1 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, provides
as follows:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection
with the offer, sale or purchase of any security
directly or indirectly
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(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1968).
Even a cursory reading of Section 61-1-1 will indicate
to the reader that the section does not by its own terms
create a private cause of action for its violation. A review
of the entire Utah Uniform Securities Act will further
show that the only section of the Act which does create
a private cause of action is Section 61-1-22 which is quoted
below:
Any person who
(a) offers or sells a security in violation of
section 61-1-3 (1), 61-1-7, or 61-1-17 (2) or of
any rule or order under section 61-1-15 which requires the affirmative approval of sales literature
before it is used, or of any condition imposed under section 61-1-10 (4), 61-1-11 (7), or
(b) offers or sells a security by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the
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untruth or omission), and who does not sustain
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the untruth or omission, is liable to
the person buying the security from him, who
may sue either at law or in equity to recover the
consideration paid for the security, together with
interest at six per cent per year from the date of
payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees,
less the amount of any income received on the
security, upon the tender of the security or for
damages if he no longer owns the security. Damages are the amount that would be recoverable
upon a tender less the value of the security when
the buyer disposed of it and interest at six per
cent per year from the date of disposition.
(2) Every person who directly or indirectly
controls a seller liable under subsection (1),
every partner, officer, or director of such a seller,
every person occupying a similar status or performing a similar function, every employee of
such a seller who materially aids in the sale, and
every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids
in the sale are also liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as the seller, unless
the nonseller who is so liable sustains the burden
of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the
existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several
persons so liable.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22 (1968).
Subsection (1) (a) of Section 61-1-22 specifically
creates a cause of action for violation of Sections 61-1-3
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(1), 61-1-17 and 61-1-17 (2), but does not create a cause
of action for violation of Section 61-1-1 of the Act. Since
Section 61-1-22 in particular and the Act in general do
not provide for a cause of action for violation of Section
61-1-1 none exists.
Plaintiffs in their brief (on page 9 thereof) maintain that unless a private cause of action for violation of
Section 61-1-1 exists only persons who sell or buy stock
can be held liable for fraud and those who aid or abet
them cannot be held liable for their unlawful actions. This
argument, however, overlooks the express provisions of
subsection (2) of Section 61-1-22, quoted above, which
creates an express cause of action against certain parties
who aid or abet a seller or buyer.
The final argument made by Plaintiffs for their position that a private cause of action exists for a violation
of Section 61-1-1 is that such a private cause of action has
been found to exist with regard to Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and that the language in these
sections is "substantially identical to Section 61-1-1".
First, Plaintiffs cite no case, treatise or other support
whatsoever for this assertion. Secondly, it is clear from
a reading of Section 10(b) and Section 17 that there
exist substantial differences between the language contained therein and the wording of Section 61-1-1 of the
Utah Code Annotated. Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 reads as follows:
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange —
• • • •

(b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U. S. C. A. § 78j (1971) (emphasis added).
The provisions of Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by their terms are clearly not limited to
persons who offer or sell a security as is the case with
Section 61-1-1 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. The
start of Section 10 speaks of "any person", clearly all
encompassing, and subpart (to) limits it only to any person who engaged in the proscribed conduct "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." This
language is manifestedly broader than the language of
Section 61-1-1 which specifically limits its applicability
in subparts (a) and (b) thereof to one who "offers or
sells a security". Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company offered or sold a security
and without such an allegation they have failed to state
a claim under the Utah Uniform Securities Act upon
which relief can be granted.
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As was the case with Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the language of Section 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933 is different in important respects
from the wording of Section 61-1-1 of the Utah Code
Annotated. Section 17(a) is quoted below:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportion or communication in interstate commerce or by the
use of the mails, directly or indirectly —
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice,
or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U. S. C. A. § 77q (1971).
Like Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Section 17(a) starts off by broadly applying to
"any person". Section 17(a) is limited, however, by going on to state that the persons covered are those who
engaged in the unlawful conduct "in the offer or sale of
any securities". The Section is not, as is Section 61-1-1,
limited to persons who offer or sell securities but covers
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any person who engage in unlawful conduct "in the offer
or sell of securities" whether the buyer, seller or a third
party and is therefore broader in scope than the Utah
Uniform Securities Act.
The fact that there might exist a private cause of
action for violation of Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act
of 1933 and/or of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is not support for Plaintiffs' position
that such a cause of action exists for violation of Section
61-1-1 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. All causes
of action created by the Utah Uniform Securities Act
are specifically designated in Section 61-1-22 thereof. No
reference is made to a cause of action for a violation of
Section 61-1-1. Moreover, to the extent that subpart
(1) (b) of that section may be construed to cover violations of Section 61-1-1, the subpart requires that the party
sued thereunder have offered or sold a security. Such an
allegation has not been made by Plaintiffs against Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company.
Finally, subpart (8) of Section 61-1-22 of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act clearly states that the Act does
not create any cause of action not specified in Section
61-1-22 or section 61-1-4 (5).
The rights and remedies provided by this
act are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity, but this
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act does not create any cause of action not specified in this section or section 61-1-4 (5).
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22 (1968) (emphasis added).
Section 61-1-4 (5) deals with suits on bonds for registered broker-dealers and is not involved in this case.
In discussing the effect of this provision, Louis Loss
in his work on securities regulations says the following:
At the federal level there is room for the
recognition of implied liabilities, because (1)
none of the SEC statutes except the 1933 act
contains a comprehensive series of express liability provisions, and (2) there can be no federal deceit or rescission remedies apart from statute. See
pages 932-46 supra, 1746-57 infra. But, given a
statute like the Uniform Securities Act in which
careful attention was paid to the scope of civil
liability in the interest of specificity and predictability, there is no room for implying liabilities which are not expressly created.
I l l L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1649 n. 100 (1961).
POINT III.
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO JOIN ONE
OR MORE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.
The motion to dismiss of Defendant, Elmer Fox &
Company in addition to being based upon Rule 12 (b) (6)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted was based upon

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
Rule 12 (b) (7) because of Plaintiffs' failure to join one
or more indispensable parties. Plaintiffs' purchase of stock
was from Commercial Liquidators, Inc., yet that Company is not a party to the action.
Plaintiffs in their brief have quoted from volume 59
of American Jurisprudence Second Edition on Parties.
With the first quote from Section 5 of said work, Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company has no quarrel. Nor does
said Defendant challenge the general principles of law
set forth in the other three quotes. Defendant, Elmer
Fox & Company would, however, like to bring additional
provisions of said work to the Court's attention.
A person who will be directly affected by a decree
of a Court on a certain subject is an indispensable party.
However, indispensable parties may be defined as those persons whose interests in the subject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound
up with those of the other parties that their legal
presence as parties to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. A rule early announced to describe parties so indispensable that a court of
equity will not proceed to final decision without
them, and often applied by the courts and still
valid today, describes indispensable parties as
follows: Persons who not only have an interest
in the controversy, but an interest of such a
nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. A person who will
be directly affected by a decree and whose inter-
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est is not represented by any party to the suit is
an indispensable party. One may be an indispensable party if his interest in the subject matter of the controversy is of such a nature that
a final decree cannot be rendered between the
other parties to the suit without inevitably
affecting that interest.
59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 13, at 359-62 (1971) (emphasis
added and footnotes omitted).
The reason for the rule is clear. Each party to the
action, such as Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, should
have those parties before the Court who are involved in
the controversy so that complete relief may be had.
The interests of Commercial Liquidators, Inc., which
has rescinded its issuance of stock to the Plaintiffs, as
well as the interests of its president, Boyd Madsen and
others will be directly affected by any decree issued by
a Court in this matter and since their interests are not
represented by any current party to the suit they are
indispensable parties.
The lower Court was therefore correct in granting
the motion to dismiss of Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to join one or more
indispensable parties. Moreover, any liability that Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company may have to Plaintiffs
for violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act is a joint
liability it shares with Commercial Liquidators, Inc., and
others who, however, have not been joined as defendants
in this lawsuit.
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CONCLUSION
The complaint of Plaintiffs fails to state a claim
against Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, upon which
relief can be granted and Plaintiffs have furthermore
failed to join one or more indispensable parties. The
lower Court was, therefore, correct in granting Defendant Elmer Fox & Company's motion to dismiss and said
action should be affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
LEONARD J. LEWIS
BRENT J. GIAUQUE
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall
& McCarthy
Attorneys for Respondent
Elmer Fox & Company
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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